Insurance Litigation Law Blog | Regulatory Law | Bad Faith | California | Lawyer | Attorney | Barger & Wolen

Strategies to Minimize the Risk of Ethics Violations and Malpractice Claims

Barger & Wolen partner David J. McMahon will be a faculty member for this Strafford Publications' CLE webinar which will provide attorneys with a framework to identify the most problematic and difficult-to-detect conflicts risks. The panel will outline best practices for attorneys to cope with conflicts that could potentially result in disqualification, discipline and malpractice.

Joining Mr. McMahon on the faculty are Brett A. Scher, Partner, Kaufman Dolowich Voluck & Gonzo, Woodbury, N.Y. and Thomas B. Mason, Partne, Zuckerman Spaeder, Washington, D.C.

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The verdict by a Los Angeles jury last week awarding a health insurance claimant over $19 million raises a pair of issues of interest to health and disability insurers. 

In Thomas Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Company, the plaintiff, an ex-Marine, sought payment for 109 days in the hospital after a fall. The insurance company believed expenses for only 19 of those days were medically necessary. A jury awarded Nickerson $35,000 in emotional distress damages, plus $19 million in punitive damages. 

As this case undoubtedly proceeds, first in a motion directed to the trial judge, and then likely on appeal, one issue that will be addressed is the appropriate amount of punitive damages that should be permitted (assuming any punitive damages survive). 

Case law in recent years has established that except in the most extraordinary circumstances, punitive damages should not exceed other compensatory damages by more than a single digit ratio. Some courts have even opined that a 4:1 ratio is the maximum amount to be awarded, and that a 2:1 or even 1:1 ratio would be more appropriate. 

Here, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages somewhat exceeds the above guidelines -- it pencils out to 543:1. It's true that depending on the level of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, and where compensatory damages are nominal, the courts may be open to approving punitive awards in excess of a the above ratios, but those circumstances do not appear to apply in this case. 

The second issue raised by the Nickerson case is the alleged obligation by an insurer to accept or give great deference to the opinion of an insured's physician, with respect to the question of medical necessity under a health policy. 

Nickerson's lawyer, William Shernoff of the Claremont, California firm of Shernoff Bidart & Echeverria LLP, has expressed the hope that this case will lead to a recognition by the courts that the medical judgment of policyholders' treating physicians should be accepted by carriers. 

In fact, this case is unlikely to lead to such a result.  

Appellate courts have long recognized that the issue of medical necessity should not be one that is dictated by the view of any particular expert or practitioner, but instead should turn on which party presents the most compelling evidence on the coverage question. 

The notion that a policyholder's doctor has a monopoly on truth or good judgment, especially when that physician may hold a view based on a longstanding affinity for a patient, and an unquestioning acceptance of self-reported symptoms that may or may not be reliable in light of clinical or objective testing, is unlikely to find favor with the bench officers asked to decide coverage questions.

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The California Department of Insurance (“CDI”) published, on March 11, 2011, proposed regulations containing suitability requirements to govern the sale of annuities (see Insurance Commissioner Jones' press release). This represents an attempt by the CDI to accomplish by regulation what it failed to accomplish several times by statute in the past decade.

The proposed regulations are based on the NAIC Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulations, as revised by the NAIC in 2010, but include some revisions.

It is important to note that for many years the CDI has held the position that the prior versions of the NAIC Suitability Model did not go far enough in protecting consumers. The CDI supported unsuccessful legislation in California at least three times in the mid-2000s that sought to impose suitability requirements that were more onerous than the then current NAIC Suitability Model.

Thus, while most states have adopted laws that follow the NAIC Suitability Model, California currently lacks laws that provide specific suitability requirements that pertain to the sale of annuities.

Given the lack of express suitability requirements, the CDI has sought to regulate suitability in connection with the sale of annuities using other tools such as:

1. general legal concepts of principal-agent responsibility;
2. requirements relating to replacements; and,
3. California Insurance Code Section 785(a)’s imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the sale on an insurance product to a senior.

The regulations proposed by the CDI include a provision that would make them applicable only to sales of annuities to purchasers aged 65 and older. This is in contrast to the NAIC Suitability Model which applies to all sales of annuities.

Another important distinction between the CDI’s proposed regulations and the NAIC Suitability Model is that the CDI proposal does not include the “FINRA Safe Harbor” provisions which were some of the primary revisions made by the NAIC to the Suitability Model last year. A public hearing will be held on the CDI’s proposed regulations on April 25, 2011. 

It is interesting to note that the The National Conference of Insurance Legislators recently endorsed the NAIC Suitability Model. Also, the Senate Insurance Committee of the California Legislature introduced legislation, SB 715, on February 18, 2011, that seeks to codify the NAIC Suitability Model. SB 715’s draft language is the same as the NAIC Suitability Model that was revised by the NAIC last year. 

It is not clear at this point in time why the CDI has proposed the NAIC Suitability Model in the form of regulations when the Model is pending as a proposed statute. One thought is that the CDI is hedging its bets. One problem that the CDI may have is that it is unclear whether there is sufficient statutory authority for the CDI to promulgate the NAIC Suitability Model as a regulation.

For more information, please contact Randall Doctor.

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By Robert W. Hogeboom and Larry M. Golub

On March 1, 2011, California State Senator Noreen Evans introduced Senate Bill 361 as spot bill legislation. The legislation was at the request of California Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones who seeks to enable consumers to obtain their out-of-pocket costs associated with claimed wrongful conduct by insurers or other licensees, which would include producers. 

As explained in Senator Evans’ press release, the bill grants explicit authority to the California Department of Insurance (CDI) to “order restitution as part of an administrative enforcement action.” 

Because the legislation is a spot bill, the next version of the bill will provide the details discussed in the press release. Senator Evans’ office also issued an SB 631 Fact Sheet that provides further information on the proposed legislation.

The press release and fact sheet acknowledge that the CDI presently does not have the authority to order insurers or other licensees to restore out-of-pocket expenses or money wrongfully obtained.   

The fact sheet provides examples of the types of monetary losses that are sought to be dealt with by SB 631:

1. health insurance rescissions for out-of-pocket costs for medical treatment that the CDI alleges should be covered under the policy;
2. the charging of a premium that is higher than allowed; and,
3. the effect of the recent court decision in MacKay v. Superior Court.  MacKay held that consumers cannot sue an insurer directly for rating activities that were subject to the CDI’s approval in the rate application process. 

The effect of this bill would likely result in the CDI initiating administrative actions based on consumer complaints as well as market conduct rating and underwriting and claims examinations for the primary purpose of ordering restitution to consumers.  

The press release advises that SB 631 would allow insurers to challenge the CDI’s determination in court, and it also states that the bill would preserve the ability of consumers to sue their insurer in court over the claimed wrongful conduct.

Perhaps just as important, the legislation allows the CDI to seek reimbursement for all of its costs in bringing the enforcement action.  Currently, the CDI has no authority to seek reimbursement for the costs it incurs in administrative actions.

Proponents of SB 631 may face an uphill battle with the aspect of this legislation that amends Proposition 103’s penalties relating to rating and underwriting matters. 

It is our preliminary analysis that Proposition 103 and California Insurance Code (CIC) § 1861.14 specify that violations of Article 10 “Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates” are subject to the penalties set forth in CIC §§ 1859.1 and 1858.07 (i.e., $5,000 for each act and $10,000 if willful). 

Because this legislation would have the effect of amending CIC § 1861.14 to provide restitution, it would require a two-thirds vote of the legislature.

For more information, contact Robert Hogeboom at (213) 614-7304 | rhogeboom@bargerwolen.com, or Larry Golub at (213) 614-7312 | lgolub@bargerwolen.com.

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