Larry Golub

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Larry Golub is a litigation partner in the firm’s Los Angeles office. His practice focuses on a wide range of litigation matters for insurance companies and non-insurance clients. His insurance expertise includes coverage litigation, class action litigation and appellate practice, as well as California Unfair Competition Law 17200-17210.
His non-insurance experience includes employment litigation and construction litigation.
Mr. Golub speaks regularly on insurance-related claims handling topics for continuing legal education providers, clients and trade organizations. He is co-editor of Barger & Wolen’s Insurance Litigation and Regulatory Law Blog.


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California Supreme Court Hears Argument on Whether Insurance Code Limits UCL Lawsuits Against Insurers

By Samuel Sorich and Larry Golub

On May 8, 2013, the California Supreme Court convened to hear oral argument in Zhang v. Superior Court. The case presents the issue of whether conduct of an insurer, which is related to conduct that would violate California’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act, Insurance Code, §790.03(h) et seq. (UIPA), can be the basis for a private civil cause of action against the insurer under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code, §17200 et seq. (UCL).

The Court of Appeal in Zhang had ruled in October 2009 that an insurer may be sued by a private citizen for conduct prohibited by the UCL even though the conduct is within the scope of the UIPA. The Supreme Court accepted review of the matter in February 2010.

At the oral argument session, counsel for the insurer relied on the California Supreme Court’s 1988 ruling in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies, which held that violations of the UIPA may be prosecuted only by administrative action taken by the Insurance Commissioner, not by civil action by private citizens. Counsel argued that the holding in Moradi-Shalal bars a UCL action against an insurer when the action is based on insurer conduct that is governed by the UIPA.

Counsel for the plaintiff insured responded that Moradi-Shalal does not preclude the insured’s UCL action against the insurer, pointing to language in the Moradi-Shalal decision which noted that “the courts retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate common law actions, based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of emotional distress, and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”

We have monitored the Zhang case and other appellate court decisions on the interplay between the UIPA and the UCL in prior blogs. Please see here, here, here and here.

The Supreme Court is required to issue a written opinion in the Zhang case within 90 days of the date of the oral argument, or by August 6, 2013.

The Supreme Court focused on the UCL this week. On May 7, 2013, the Court heard oral argument in Rose v. Bank of America which presents an issue analogous to the issue in Zhang. The question in Rose is whether a cause of action under the UCL can be predicated on an alleged violation of the Truth in Savings Act (12 U.S.C. $4301 et seq.) despite Congress’s repeal of the private right of action initially provided for under that Act.

 

California Court of Appeal Again Finds No Stacking of Liability Policy Limits

Nearly two years ago, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District issued a decision that upheld the concept of horizontal exhaustion of primary liability policy limits before triggering the obligation of an excess insurer, but also concluded that, in the context of that case, there was no stacking of liability insurance policies. The case was Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, and we reported on it in this blog.

The California Supreme Court accepted review of Kaiser Cement, but then returned the case to the Court of Appeal after the Supreme Court issued its decision in State of California v. Continental Insurance Co., 55 Cal. 4th 186 (2012), a decision we also reported on in a prior blog

In Continental, the Supreme Court adopted the “all-sums-with-stacking” approach to addressing indemnification for continuous injury cases. With respect to the stacking issue, the Court found that allowing the insured to “stack” its policies and recover up to the policy limits of all the triggered policies was not only the correct rule based on the policy language but also the equitable result and one that can be achieved “with a comparatively uncomplicated calculation.” The Court, however, advised that insurers may be able to enforce “anti-stacking” provisions in their policies to avoid such a result.  

In the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal panel in Kaiser Cement, the primary policy considered in that case contained such language that precluding stacking of policy limits. Other than its addition of a brief section on the Continental decision (and some other minor revisions), the second opinion in Kaiser Cement, issued April 8, 2013, is virtually identical to the prior opinion issued June 3, 2011.

The underlying dispute involved coverage obligations for thousands of asbestos bodily injury claims brought against Kaiser, and in an even earlier decision, the appellate court held that asbestos bodily injury claims should be treated as multiple occurrences under the primary policies issued to Kaiser by Truck Insurance Exchange, rather than one single occurrence for multiple claimants. The primary policies all had non-aggregating per-occurrence limits, meaning the policies potentially could be on the hook for the total per-occurrence limit for each occurrence.

The present appeal addressed the situation as to whether, when an asbestos bodily injury claim exceeded the primary coverage issued by Truck in a particular year, the excess coverage issued by Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) was triggered to provide indemnification to Kaiser. Because the case involved asbestos bodily injury, which continues to cause injury over time, even with a single claimant, a claim could trigger coverage in multiple policy years, and ICSOP argued that the insured had to exhaust all underlying primary policies for all years in which coverage was triggered. Kaiser and Truck both argued that the ICSOP excess policy was triggered upon exhaustion of the single $500,000 per occurrence limit.

The 2013 Kaiser Cement decision, just like the one in 2011, issued three holdings:

First, it held that the excess insurer ICSOP was entitled to horizontally exhaust all underlying primary insurance that was collectible and valid, and not just those policies directly underneath its excess policy.

The second holding, however, concluded that ICSOP was not able to “stack” the individual limits of the Truck primary policies. The court did not base this holding on judicially imposed anti-stacking principles, but rather concluded that under the particular language of the Truck policies, Truck could only be liable as a company for one per-occurrence limit for each occurrence. Specifically, the court cited the language in the insuring agreement stating that,

the Company’s liability as respects any occurrence . . . shall not exceed the per occurrence limit designated in the Declarations. (Italics added by court.) 

Thus, the court permitted horizontal exhaustion in principle but held that there was no valid and collectible insurance to horizontally exhaust in this case since Kaiser was only entitled to one per-occurrence limit for Truck as a whole for claims that exceeded the $500,000 per occurrence limit in the implicated Truck policy.

It was in this part of the Court’s analysis that it considered and analyzed the Continental decision, explaining that its “conclusion that Kaiser may not ‘stack’ Truck’s annual liability limits is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Continental” because Truck’s policy language was the type of provision envisioned by the Continental decision that precluded the stacking of policy limits for any one occurrence.  

Finally, as with the prior decision in Kaiser Cement, the Court of Appeal found that the summary judgment that had been issued by the trial court in favor of Kaiser had to be reversed because, on the present record, the appellate court could not determine if there was primary coverage issued to Kaiser by other insurers (outside of Truck) whose primary policies still needed to be exhausted under the court’s horizontal exhaustion ruling.

As of the moment, the Kaiser Cement decision remains citable law, though its status could change if review is sought from the Supreme Court and such review is accepted.

Barring such action, the case is helpful to excess insures as it affirms the obligation that horizontal exhaustion of all primary insurance is still the rule in the continuous occurrence context.

For primary insurers, the case affords the opportunity to avoid stacking of policy limits in those situations in which specific policy language precludes triggering more than one policy limit per occurrence. As we noted in our prior blog on the Kaiser Cement case, a careful review of the specific policy language found in each primary and excess policy at issue is required.

Judge Invalidates California Regulation on Estimating Replacement Costs for Homeowners Insurance

By Samuel Sorich and Larry Golub

On March 25, 2013, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Gregory Alarcon issued a decision which found the California Department of Insurance’s regulation on estimating replacement costs for homeowners insurance to be invalid. The decision is Association of California Insurance Companies and Personal Insurance Federation of California v. Jones.

California Code of Regulation section 2695.183 was adopted by the insurance commissioner in 2010; the regulation went into effect on June 27, 2011. Section 2695.183 requires insurers to use a detailed method for estimating replacement costs for homeowners insurance. The regulation specifies that an insurer that communicates an estimate which does not comport with the regulation’s method makes a misleading statement in violation of Insurance Code section 790.03.

Two insurer trade associations, the Association of California Insurance Companies and Personal Insurance Federation of California, challenged the validity of section 2695.183. The associations petitioned the Los Angeles Superior Court for a judgment declaring section 2695.183 to be invalid because its adoption is beyond the insurance commissioner’s authority. Judge Alarcon granted the associations’ petition.

Insurance Code section 790.03 defines unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance. Subdivision (b) of section 790.03 states that the definition of unfair or deceptive acts includes making a statement “which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading.” The insurance commissioner relied on section 790.03(b) as authority to adopt section 2695.183, contending that the regulation simply interpreted section 790.03 by identifying one type of misleading statement.

Judge Alarcon rejected the commissioner’s reliance on section 790.03(b). The judge’s decision explains,

By characterizing all estimates of replacement costs as misleading (save the one provided by 10 CCR § 2695.183), Defendant, in exercising its authority under § 790.10, expands the meaning of something ‘known’ or which ‘should be known’ to be misleading beyond the parameters of § 790.03(b).”

Judge Alarcon’s decision notes that “[t]he limits of the authority granted by § 790.03 are underscored by Cal Ins Code § 790.06 which provides a special process which the commissioner can determine how acts not listed in § 790.03 can be defined as unfair or deceptive.”

The need to interpret the authority granted to the insurance commissioner by Insurance Code section 790.03 in light of Insurance Code section 790.06 was also central to the recent decision of California Administrative Law Judge Stephen J. Smith, who found that the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations may not be used by the insurance commissioner to constitute unfair claims acts under section 790.03, which was discussed in this blog post.

Supreme Court Closes CAFA Loophole

A unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court has restored the integrity of the Class Action Fairness Act, or CAFA. At issue in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles was the transparent attempt by a named plaintiff to ouster federal court jurisdiction by “stipulating” that the damages sought through a class action complaint would not exceed the $5,000,000 minimum jurisdictional limit of CAFA. 

In a brief and direct decision, Justice Stephen Breyer disallowed the use of such a pre-certification stipulation, concluding that prior to the issuance of any certification order, a named plaintiff does not have the ability to bind absent class members and to concede the value of those class members’ claims.

Knowles was the named plaintiff in an action filed in Arkansas state court against Standard Fire concerning an alleged practice of failing to include general contractor fees in homeowner’s insurance loss payments. The complaint filed by Knowles, as well as an attachment to the complaint, contained a stipulation that Knowles and the Class would not seek to recover damages “in excess of $5,000,000 in the aggregate.” 

Accordingly, after Standard Fire removed the action to federal court under CAFA jurisdiction, Knowles moved to remand the action back to state court based on the stipulation that Knowles claimed made the “amount in controversy” fall beneath the $5,000,000 CAFA threshold and therefore defeated jurisdiction under CAFA. While the federal district court agreed with Knowles, other cases reached the opposite view, and thus the issue ended up at the Supreme Court.

In Knowles, the district court had found that the amount at issue would have exceeded the $5,000,000 minimum limit, but for the stipulation. As such, the Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that the stipulation was ineffective to bind absent class members because, at the precertification stage, the proposed class members are not yet – and potentially never will be – parties to the action, and thus the named plaintiff cannot bind those non-parties. At the pre-certification stage, the named plaintiff cannot bind “anyone but himself.”

In enacting CAFA, Congress sought to relax the jurisdictional threshold of class actions and ensure “Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.” The unilateral “stipulation” attempted in Knowles and in other cases not only frustrated the intent of Congress but also prejudiced the claims of absent class members. The Supreme Court correctly restored the balance in CAFA.

California Supreme Court Allows "Continuous Accrual" Doctrine to Avoid Statute of Limitations for "Unfair" UCL Claim

Seeking to clarify the extent to which the four-year statute of limitations applies to claims under the Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”), a unanimous California Supreme Court today issued its decision in Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., allowing at least a portion of the plaintiff’s UCL claim to proceed beyond demurrer.

Relying on the continuous accrual doctrine, the Court explained that this equitable exception to the usual rules governing limitations periods would permit the plaintiff to pursue:

at least some [alleged unfair] acts within the four years preceding suit, [and thus] the suit is not entirely time-barred.”

Background

The plaintiff ran a copying business and entered into two agreements with Canon (one in November 2001 and one in February 2002) to lease copiers. The agreements required the plaintiff to pay monthly rent for each copier, subject to a maximum copy allowance. If plaintiff exceeded the monthly allowance, he had to pay an additional per copy charge. The agreements also provided that Canon would service the copiers. 

Beginning in 2002, plaintiff noticed discrepancies between meter readings taken by Canon employees and the actual number of copies made on each copier, and he began compiling independent records. Plaintiff alleged that Canon employees had run thousands of test copies during 17 service visits between February 2002 and November 2004, which he claimed resulted in him exceeding his monthly allowances and having to pay excess copy charges and fees to Canon.

Plaintiff delayed until January 2008 before he filed a single-claim complaint for violation of the UCL. In that complaint, plaintiff alleged that Canon’s practice of charging for test copies implicated both the unfair and fraudulent prong of the UCL.

Canon demurred to the complaint, contending that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations for UCL claims. After permitting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint two times, the trial court dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the dismissal and held that neither the “delayed discovery” rule nor the “continuing violation doctrine” applied to avoid the statute of limitations. The dissenting opinion would have allowed plaintiff to proceed with a portion of his claim under the “continuous accrual” theory for those parts of the claim that were not time-barred.

Supreme Court Decision

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California Supreme Court Depublishes Decision that Found Claims Adjusters Not Exempt from California's Overtime Pay Requirement

 

By Larry Golub and Sam Sorich

On July 23, 2012, we reported that the California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District) held in Harris v. Superior Court that claims adjusters for two insurers were not exempt from California’s overtime compensation laws. More specifically, the court concluded that the duties of those adjusters functioned as the day-to-day operations of the insurers and were not “directly related to management policies or general business operations” to fall within exempt status under California law.

The Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in the case was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court on December 29, 2011, and the intermediate court was told to apply the correct analysis. Consequently, our prior report expected this second decision, as issued by a divided panel of the Court of Appeal, again to be presented to the Supreme Court seeking a petition for review.

Indeed, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Golden Eagle Insurance Corporation, the insurers sued in the action, filed a Petition for Review on September 4, 2012, followed by a request to have the Court of Appeal’s decision depublished, as submitted by the California Employment Law Council.

On October 24, the Supreme Court ended the appellate proceedings in this case by (1) denying the Petition for Review and (2) depublishing the Court of Appeal decision. By this action, while the case is final as between the plaintiff claims adjusters and the insurers, the decision cannot be cited as authority in any other case.

With removal of this case from the precedential decisions of California law, the issue as to whether insurance adjusters in other cases and other contexts are exempt employees will continue to be litigated.

Du Two - Ninth Circuit Backs Off on Controversial Duty to Settle Decision

 

In June 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in Du v. Allstate Insurance Company that asserted a liability insurer must “effectuate” or initiate a settlement within policy limits after liability has become reasonably clear. That decision generated extensive criticism, including on this blog.

Less than four months later, some semblance of balance has been restored with the issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s October 5, 2012 amended decision in Du. The amended decision replaces the court’s prior ruling and, most significantly, relegates its prior ruling as to the duty to “effectuate” settlement to merely raising the concept but concluding that it “need not resolve” this legal issue. 

Whatever the reason for the court’s retreat, the Ninth Circuit panel found, as it did in its original decision, that a jury instruction proffered by the plaintiff that raised the duty to “effectuate” settlement issue was not supported by the evidence and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the instruction.

While the amended decision still references case law that it asserts extends “the duty to settle beyond mere acceptance of a reasonable settlement demand,” it also cites to California case law “suggesting no breach of the good faith duty to settle can be found in the absence of a settlement demand, the typical context in which the duty has been found.”  While this language will remain in the final decision, at most it is only dicta.

The amended decision also backtracked on another criticized finding, namely, that the “genuine dispute doctrine” does not apply to third party duty to settle cases.  Once again, while the original decision found the doctrine did not apply in third party cases, the amended decision advised: “[w]e need not resolve” this legal issue. 

Hopefully, with the issuance of the amended decision in Du, the parameters of the “duty to settle” under California law have been substantially restored.

Standard CGL Policy "Personal Injury" Coverage Excludes Defense for Housing Discrimination, But Broader Umbrella Policy Provides Duty to Defend

By Samuel Sorich and Larry Golub

In Federal Insurance Company v. Steadfast Insurance Company, issued September 24, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that two primary liability policies that provided “personal injury” coverage for wrongful eviction, wrongful entry and invasion of the right of private occupancy did not impose a duty to defend a complaint alleging discriminatory in housing. At the same time, an umbrella policy that specifically covered discrimination did obligate that insurer to defend the insured.

Sterling managed rental properties. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against Sterling alleging discrimination based on race, national origin and familial status in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Sterling perpetuated an environment that was hostile to non-Korean tenants, provided inferior treatment to non-Korean tenants, and refused to rent and discriminated against African Americans. The Department of Justice asserted that Sterling’s discriminatory practices included entering a tenant’s apartment without notice or knocking.

Sterling had two primary liability policies, one for two years with Steadfast Insurance Company followed by three years of coverage with Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, and excess-umbrella policies for several years with Federal Insurance Company. The Steadfast and Liberty policies were standard primary policies and provided coverage for “personal injury” resulting from wrongful eviction, wrongful entry or invasion of the right of private occupancy. The umbrella portion of the Federal policies’ “personal injury” coverage not only defined such coverage to include wrongful eviction, wrongful entry and invasion of the right of private occupancy but also covered discrimination based on race or national origin.

Sterling tendered its defense of the Fair Housing Act complaint to the three insurers. When Steadfast and Liberty refused to defend the action, Federal defended under a reservation of rights and then brought a coverage action against the two primary insurers. Steadfast also brought a cross-action against Federal.  

Federal contended that Steadfast and Liberty, as primary insurers, had a duty to defend; and because the insurers had a duty to defend, Federal’s duty to defend under its umbrella coverage did not attach. Federal based its position on the argument that Sterling’s creation of a hostile environment for the tenants amounted to a claim of constructive eviction, thus falling under the personal injury coverage for wrongful eviction, wrongful entry, and the invasion of the right of private occupancy in the Steadfast and Liberty policies. 

The trial court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, found that only Federal’s umbrella policy provided coverage, and not the two primary policies. An appeal followed..

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that even though the complaint for discrimination alleged acts that might involve wrongful evictions, wrongful entries, or invasions of the right of private occupancy, the essential nature of the complaint was a Fair Housing Act enforcement action.

The court concluded the complaint “cannot be construed as asserting common law theories of wrongful eviction, wrongful entry, or invasion of the right of private occupancy. Only the tenant can claim wrongful eviction, wrongful entry, or invasion of the right of private occupancy.”

The court ruled that neither Steadfast nor Liberty had a duty to defend the Fair Housing Act action, but Federal did have a duty to defend Sterling. The court’s opinion explained,

Because the Sterling action was based on discrimination and only the Federal policies, and not the Steadfast or Liberty policies, provided coverage for discrimination claims, the umbrella coverage in the Federal policies ‘dropped down’ to fill the gap in the Steadfast and Liberty policies and provide primary coverage in the Sterling action.

Update: California Health Insurance Initiative Will Be on the Ballot in November 2014

On June 28, we reported that a proposed initiative that would bring prior approval of rates for health insurance to California had failed to qualify for the November 2012 California ballot. 

An earlier blog addressed in more detail that the the initiative would have:

  1. given the California Insurance Commissioner the power to approve health insurance rates proposed after November 6, 2012;
  2. required health insurers’ rate applications to be accompanied by a sworn statement by the insurer’s chief executive officer declaring that the contents of the application were accurate and complied in all respects with California law; and
  3. required health insurers to pay refunds with interest if the Commissioner determined that the company’s rates were excessive.

While the initiative failed to qualify for the November 2012 ballot, we observed that the backers of the initiative were seeking to obtain the requisite number of valid signatures to place the initiative on the next general election ballot in November 2014.

According to the Secretary of State, on August 23, 2012, the initiative qualified for the general election to occur on November 4, 2014.

This will ensure plenty of time for both sides to present to the California electorate their arguments in favor of and against the as-of-yet un-numbered proposition.  We will continue to update developments on this ballot initiative.    

California Legislature Passes Iran Investment Bill

by Larry Golub and Sam Sorich

On August 22, 2012, the California Assembly gave final legislative approval to Assembly Bill 2160. This bill would require the California insurance commissioner to treat a domestic insurer’s investment in a company that has business operations in Iran as a non-admitted asset.

The Assembly’s 64-2 vote to concur in Senate amendments to the bill resulted in final passage of the measure. The Senate has passed the measure on August 20, 2012. AB 2160 is now being sent to Governor Jerry Brown. The governor has until September 30, 2012, to act on the bill.

Our latest blog on AB 2160 was discussed here.   

 

Older Entries

August 10, 2012 — Updated: Fight Begins Over Prop 33 - Even as to the Ballot Language

August 9, 2012 — California Supreme Court Adopts "All-Sums-With-Stacking" Rule for Continuous Injury Cases

August 8, 2012 — Court of Appeal Affirms Buss Reimbursement of Non-Covered Settlement to Insurer

August 3, 2012 — Fight Begins Over Prop 33 - Even as to the Ballot Language

July 23, 2012 — Court of Appeal Again Finds Claims Adjusters Not Exempt from California's Overtime Pay Requirement

July 11, 2012 — 2012 Automobile Insurance Discount Act will be Proposition 33 on November California Ballot

June 28, 2012 — California Health Insurance Initiative Fails to Qualify for November Ballot

April 12, 2012 — California Supreme Court Refines the Scope of Considering "the Merits" of the Case in Class Certification Motions

March 11, 2012 — California Court of Appeal Extends Howell v. Hamilton Meats Rule to Limit Injured Person's Medical Expenses to Discounted Amounts Paid Under Workers' Compensation

February 6, 2012 — California Department of Insurance Settles Suit Over Iran Investments

January 13, 2012 — Next Up in the 'Tort War': Discounted Medical Expenses?

January 6, 2012 — Signatures May Be Collected for California Health Insurance Initiative

December 29, 2011 — California Supreme Court Rules that Court of Appeal Used Incorrect Legal Analysis in Deciding that Claims Adjusters Are Not Exempt from Overtime Pay Requirement

August 18, 2011 — Collateral Source Rule Inapplicable When Injured Person's Medical Expenses are Discounted by Health Insurer

July 16, 2011 — California Courts Continue to Rein in Class Certification in the Marketing and Sale of Insurance

June 23, 2011 — No Certification in Massive Wal-Mart Class Action

June 16, 2011 — Another Toehold in Using the UCL to Scale the Barriers of Moradi-Shalal

June 8, 2011 — Horizontal Exhaustion Analyzed by California Court in Continuous Damage Case

May 30, 2011 — California Court Dismisses UCL Claim Over Fiji Water

May 26, 2011 — California Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones' Holds Investigatory Hearing on Life Insurer Claims Payments of Death Benefits

April 11, 2011 — Two Air Ambulance Suits Grounded in Two Days by Federal and State Courts

April 8, 2011 — Insurers Can Only Seek to Pay "Cumis" Rates if They are Actually Defending the Insured

March 8, 2011 — New Restitution Remedy Proposed for Insurers and Licensees in California

February 17, 2011 — California Supreme Court Holds that Zip Codes Constitute "Personal Identification Information" under the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Triggering a Flurry of Consumer Lawsuits

January 30, 2011 — California Supreme Court Announces Expansive Standing Rule Under the UCL

November 21, 2010 — California Supreme Court Again Confirms a Penalty is Not Restitution Under the UCL

November 11, 2010 — Commissioner Poizner Criticized By Director of Office of Administrative Law Over His Filing of Lawsuit Concerning Iran "Underground" Regulations

November 9, 2010 — Commissioner Poizner Files Suit Against Office of Administrative Law

October 12, 2010 — California Office of Administrative Law Disallows Insurance Department Rule on Iranian Investments

September 27, 2010 — Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009 Now in Effect

September 3, 2010 — Dismissal of Class Allegations at Pleading Stage Disallowed - Again

August 9, 2010 — California Supreme Court Holds Treble Damages Not Permitted under the Unfair Competition Law - Restitution is the Sole Monetary Remedy

July 12, 2010 — California Supreme Court Precludes Pass-On Defense in Clayton Act Claim and Finds Standing Under the UCL

July 11, 2010 — California Court of Appeal Opinions Uphold Class Settlements Over Claims of Objectors

July 2, 2010 — The Federal Insurance Office is on the Way

June 25, 2010 — Imprecise Policy Language Results in Umbrella Policy Becoming Primary for Duty to Defend Purposes

June 24, 2010 — California Supreme Court Resolves Coverage Dispute Over Interplay Between Intentional Acts Exclusion and Severability Clause

May 13, 2010 — California Insurance Commissioner Issues List of 296 Insurers Refusing to Agree Not to Invest in "Iran-Related" Companies

March 16, 2010 — Los Angeles Jury Finds Health Insurer is Required to Pay for Out-of-State Liver Transplant

March 11, 2010 — From Out of the Blue Comes a Proposed Exemption for Air Ambulance Companies to Avoid California Workers' Compensation Official Medical Fee Schedule

February 4, 2010 — Unfair Competition Law Cases Still Occupy Numerous Spaces on the California Supreme Court's Docket

January 25, 2010 — California Court of Appeal Upholds Insurer's Rescission of Health Insurance Policy

January 11, 2010 — Federal Court Denies Class Certification Motion Involving Deferred Annuities

November 3, 2009 — California Appellate Court Clarifies Issues Raised in Tobacco II

October 18, 2009 — Staying an Insurer's Declaratory Relief Action - the Rules Clarified

September 25, 2009 — 24-Hour Health Coverage Draws Industry Fire

August 29, 2009 — Ninth Circuit Overrules Denial of Class Certification Ruling in Annuity Litigation, Adopting a De Novo Standard of Review

August 10, 2009 — Appellate Court Finds Insured's Failure to Allege the Actual Theory of Liability on Which the Trial Court Based Its Judgment Requires Reversal of Bad Faith Judgment

August 4, 2009 — California Supreme Court Finds No Duty to Defend Insured for Assault and Battery Claim Where Injured Party Alleged Insured Acted Under an Unreasonable Belief in the Need for Self-Defense

July 30, 2009 — Federal Court Dismisses Claim by Air Ambulance Company Seeking to Avoid California Workers' Compensation Official Medical Fee Schedule

July 13, 2009 — Ninth Circuit Upholds Use of "Preemptive" Motion to Deny Class Certification

July 1, 2009 — Welcome to Our Blog

June 30, 2009 — California Supreme Court Further Clarifies Scope of UCL Claims Following Proposition 64

June 26, 2009 — California Court of Appeal Establishes "Diligent Inquiry" Notice Rule for Equitable Contribution Claims Between Insurers