Insurance Litigation Law Blog | Regulatory Law | Bad Faith | California | Lawyer | Attorney | Barger & Wolen

by Evan L. Smoak and Kyle M. Medley

In a Barger & Wolen victory, the U.S. District Court in Manhattan has confirmed an arbitration panel’s interim order, which required a policyholder to post pre-hearing security in the amount sought by an insurer. On Time Staffing, LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 10 Civ. 9583 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50683 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2011).   

In On Time, the arbitration panel issued an interim order of pre-hearing security in favor of National Union against one of its policyholders, On Time. National Union had argued that the policyholder was financially unable or simply unwilling to pay on the amount National Union sought in the arbitration for premiums, fees, and expenses. 

The policyholder asked the court to vacate the order of pre-hearing security on two grounds. First, the policyholder argued that the panel had exceeded its authority by awarding pre-hearing security (under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act “FAA”). Second, the policyholder argued that the Panel’s order of pre-hearing security before a full evidentiary hearing constituted “misconduct” by the Panel (under Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA). Judge Jed S. Rakoff rejected both of the policyholder’s arguments.

First, the court found that the arbitration panel had not exceeded its authority, noting that the language of the arbitration clause gave the Panel broad authority to resolve “any” dispute and to make its award “final and binding”. The court stated:

Prior to the rendering of its final decision, the Panel, in the absence of language expressly to the contrary, possesses the inherent authority to preserve the integrity of the arbitration process to which the parties have agreed by, if warranted, requiring the posting of security. Otherwise, an arbitration panel with a well-founded concern that a party was financially unable to satisfy an eventual award would have no recourse to protect itself against the risk that its significant expenditures of time and effort would be for naught. 

On Time, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50683 at *12 (underline added). 

Second, the court rejected the policyholder’s argument that the Panel had committed misconduct when it ordered security without a full evidentiary hearing. The court found that the arbitrators “need not follow all of the niceties observed by the federal courts”, but instead had to “merely grant a fundamentally fair hearing”. Id. at *13. In any event, the court found the policyholder had “an ample opportunity to oppose the motion for pre-hearing security, and did, in fact, vigorously oppose it”. Id. at *14.

This significant victory confirms a pre-hearing security order against a policyholder and in favor of an insurer.

For additional information about this decision, or the arguments considered by the court, please contact Evan Smoak (esmoak@bargerwolen.com) or Kyle Medley (kmedley@bargerwolen.com) in Barger & Wolen’s New York office (212-557-2800).

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by Evan L. Smoak and Kyle M. Medley

In a Barger & Wolen victory, the U.S. District Court in Manhattan has confirmed an arbitration panel’s interim order, which required a policyholder to post pre-hearing security in the amount sought by an insurer. On Time Staffing, LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 10 Civ. 9583 (JSR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50683 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2011).   

In On Time, the arbitration panel issued an interim order of pre-hearing security in favor of National Union against one of its policyholders, On Time. National Union had argued that the policyholder was financially unable or simply unwilling to pay on the amount National Union sought in the arbitration for premiums, fees, and expenses. 

The policyholder asked the court to vacate the order of pre-hearing security on two grounds. First, the policyholder argued that the panel had exceeded its authority by awarding pre-hearing security (under Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act “FAA”). Second, the policyholder argued that the Panel’s order of pre-hearing security before a full evidentiary hearing constituted “misconduct” by the Panel (under Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA). Judge Jed S. Rakoff rejected both of the policyholder’s arguments.

First, the court found that the arbitration panel had not exceeded its authority, noting that the language of the arbitration clause gave the Panel broad authority to resolve “any” dispute and to make its award “final and binding”. The court stated:

Prior to the rendering of its final decision, the Panel, in the absence of language expressly to the contrary, possesses the inherent authority to preserve the integrity of the arbitration process to which the parties have agreed by, if warranted, requiring the posting of security. Otherwise, an arbitration panel with a well-founded concern that a party was financially unable to satisfy an eventual award would have no recourse to protect itself against the risk that its significant expenditures of time and effort would be for naught. 

On Time, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50683 at *12 (underline added). 

Second, the court rejected the policyholder’s argument that the Panel had committed misconduct when it ordered security without a full evidentiary hearing. The court found that the arbitrators “need not follow all of the niceties observed by the federal courts”, but instead had to “merely grant a fundamentally fair hearing”. Id. at *13. In any event, the court found the policyholder had “an ample opportunity to oppose the motion for pre-hearing security, and did, in fact, vigorously oppose it”. Id. at *14.

This significant victory confirms a pre-hearing security order against a policyholder and in favor of an insurer.

For additional information about this decision, or the arguments considered by the court, please contact Evan Smoak (esmoak@bargerwolen.com) or Kyle Medley (kmedley@bargerwolen.com) in Barger & Wolen’s New York office (212-557-2800).

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By Richard B. Hopkins and John C. Holmes

On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued an important decision in AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, No. 09-893, impacting the ability of defendants to move to compel arbitration in response to consumer class action complaints.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court overturned a Ninth Circuit ruling that had held an arbitration provision in AT&T Mobility contracts to be invalid. 

The arbitration provision in question required all disputes to be brought in the party’s

individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.

Plaintiffs originally filed an individual claim in federal district court alleging that AT&T improperly charged approximately $30 in sales taxes on mobile phones that AT&T advertised as free. The case was consolidated into a putative class action. 

The question presented in the case was whether §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. This rule is known as the Discover Bank rule, after the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).

The majority of the Supreme Court held that requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA. The Court further held that class arbitration, to the extent it is mandated by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.

The Court noted that arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. 

In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an interlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final judgment as well. 

However, in arbitration, decisions are subject to very limited review. 

Moreover, the Court noted, arbitrators are seldom experienced in class action procedure and classwide arbitration consistently takes years to resolve. 

Indeed, the Court noted that as of September 2009, the American Arbitration Association had opened 283 class arbitrations. Of those, 121 remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or dismissed. Not a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits.

The Court also emphasized that the district court and Ninth Circuit found that the arbitration provision at issue was

sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]” to be made whole.’

At issue was an agreement which permitted customers to initiate a dispute by completing a form on AT&T’s website. Thereafter, AT&T was permitted under its agreement to offer to settle the claim. If it did not settle within 30 days, the customer was required to submit the claim to arbitration. 

The agreement required that in the event of arbitration, AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims and that the arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer was billed. The agreement also provided, for claims under $10,000, that the customer could elect to conduct the arbitration via telephone, in-person or on written submissions only and that either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration. The agreement also permitted the arbitrator to award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages. 

The agreement also denied AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer, required AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Robert, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined. Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

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By Richard B. Hopkins and John C. Holmes

On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court issued an important decision in AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion, No. 09-893, impacting the ability of defendants to move to compel arbitration in response to consumer class action complaints.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court overturned a Ninth Circuit ruling that had held an arbitration provision in AT&T Mobility contracts to be invalid. 

The arbitration provision in question required all disputes to be brought in the party’s

individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.

Plaintiffs originally filed an individual claim in federal district court alleging that AT&T improperly charged approximately $30 in sales taxes on mobile phones that AT&T advertised as free. The case was consolidated into a putative class action. 

The question presented in the case was whether §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. This rule is known as the Discover Bank rule, after the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).

The majority of the Supreme Court held that requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA. The Court further held that class arbitration, to the extent it is mandated by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.

The Court noted that arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. 

In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an interlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final judgment as well. 

However, in arbitration, decisions are subject to very limited review. 

Moreover, the Court noted, arbitrators are seldom experienced in class action procedure and classwide arbitration consistently takes years to resolve. 

Indeed, the Court noted that as of September 2009, the American Arbitration Association had opened 283 class arbitrations. Of those, 121 remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or dismissed. Not a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits.

The Court also emphasized that the district court and Ninth Circuit found that the arbitration provision at issue was

sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]” to be made whole.’

At issue was an agreement which permitted customers to initiate a dispute by completing a form on AT&T’s website. Thereafter, AT&T was permitted under its agreement to offer to settle the claim. If it did not settle within 30 days, the customer was required to submit the claim to arbitration. 

The agreement required that in the event of arbitration, AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims and that the arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer was billed. The agreement also provided, for claims under $10,000, that the customer could elect to conduct the arbitration via telephone, in-person or on written submissions only and that either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration. The agreement also permitted the arbitrator to award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably punitive damages. 

The agreement also denied AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer, required AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Robert, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined. Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

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Recent Barger & Wolen Victory Answers Who Decides What to Do After Hall Street

by Evan L. Smoak and Alison J. Shilling

In March 2008, the United States Supreme Court held that parties may not contractually expand the scope of judicial review to include “errors of law.” Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to enforce an arbitration clause provision that allowed judicial review of an arbitrator’s errors of law. 

In the wake of Hall Street, parties have disputed whether an “error of law” provision in an arbitration clause invalidates the entire arbitration agreement, and whether such a dispute should be decided by the courts or by arbitrators.

A Barger & Wolen victory this month in a New York appellate court has answered who should decide the issue. See Life Receivables Trust v. Goshawk Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s, __, N.Y.S.2d. __, No. 602934/08, 2009 WL 3255942 (1st Dep’t Oct. 13, 2009). That question is for the arbitrators where the arbitration clause incorporates AAA or similar rules.

In Life Receivables, the arbitration clause contained an “errors of law” provision. The appellants asked the court to enjoin pending arbitrations, arguing that Hall Street invalidated the arbitration clause. The motion court refused to enjoin the arbitrations, and the appellate court affirmed. The arbitration clause at issue provided for arbitration of all disputes and incorporated the AAA rules by reference. Noting that the AAA rules authorize arbitrators to determine the “existence, scope or validity” of an arbitration agreement, the appellate court held that the arbitrators would determine what to do in light of Hall Street, even though that question is usually for the court:

Although the question of arbitrability is generally an issue for judicial determination, when the parties’ agreement specifically incorporates by reference the AAA rules, which provide that the tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement, and employs language referring all disputes to arbitration, courts will leave the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators. Id. (internal citations omitted).

As a result, the appellate court ordered that the disputes return to arbitration, as Barger & Wolen’s client had argued.

For additional information about this decision, or the Hall Street arguments considered by the court, please contact Steven Anderson (sanderson@bargerwolen.com) or Evan Smoak (esmoak@bargerwolen.com) in Barger & Wolen’s New York office (212-557-2800).

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