California Appellate Court Clarifies Issues Raised in Tobacco II

A California Court of Appeal decision published on October 28, 2009, analyzes whether UCL “standing” rules announced by the California Supreme Court in In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009), carry over when a trial court considers the requisite elements to certify a class action. The answer, at least from the Eighth Appellate District, is that they do not. 

In Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., the plaintiff sued the satellite television company under both the Unfair Competition Law or “UCL” (Business & Professions Code sections 17200 et seq.) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act or “CLRA” (Civil Code sections 1750 et seq.), claiming that the company falsely advertised the quality of the High Definition (“HD”) resolution that it was transmitting to its customers. Cohen sought to certify a nationwide class. In opposition to a motion for class certification, DIRECTV presented a number of declarations from its customers that explained that their individual decisions to purchase the HD upgraded system were not based on seeing any advertising or promotional materials from the company, but rather on word of mouth, lower prices, or just because they bought an HDTV. On those facts, the trial court denied certification, finding that common legal and factual issues did not predominate.

On appeal, the court first found that no common legal issues predominated, agreeing with the trial court that the subscribers’ legal rights would vary from state to state and that subscribers outside of California may not be protected by the UCL or the CLRA. It also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to redefine the class to include only California residents, reasoning that, even with a California-only class, plaintiff still could not show that common factual issues would predominate over individual factual issues.

As for whether common issues predominated, the court concluded that there were myriad reasons why subscribers had purchased the HD upgrade that were far removed from the alleged misleading advertisements as to resolution of the HD transmission. More particularly, the court found commonality lacking since actual reliance would need to be shown for an award of damages under the CLRA and for restitution/injunctive relief under the UCL. As for the decision in Tobacco II, the court explained that the Supreme Court in that case had been concerned with the issue of standing under the UCL and that, in the context of standing, only the class representative needed to satisfy the requirement and that there was no need for the class members to show actual reliance.

However, at the time of considering class certification, the Cohen court found “Tobacco II to be irrelevant because the issue of ‘standing’ simply is not the same thing as the issue of ‘commonality.’” Rather, at the time of considering class certification, the trial court was concerned that the UCL and CLRA claims alleged by plaintiff and the other class members “would involve factual questions associated with their reliance on DIRECTV’s alleged false representation,” which was a proper criterion to consider for commonality – “even after Tobacco II.”

Cohen is the second case published last week that affirmed the denial of class certification of a UCL claim and addressed the impact, or, more correctly, the lack of impact, of the decision in Tobacco II. The other decision is Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha et al., published October 26, 2009, a decision in which Barger & Wolen represented the defendant, and is discussed in the Life, Health and Disability Insurance Law blog.

Court of Appeal Hands UCL Win to Plaintiffs, Shrinks Impact of Moradi-Shalal

A recent ruling by the California Court of Appeal in a UCL action will likely lead to a showdown in the California Supreme Court over the reach of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287 (1988), the ruling that barred private actions seeking to enforce California’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act, namely, Insurance Code Section 790.03, et seq. (“Section 790.03”). 

For years plaintiffs’ lawyers and insurers have grappled over the question of whether causes of action for violation of California’s “Unfair Competition Law” (Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., or “UCL”) may allege conduct that violates Section 790.03. Insurers have generally prevailed in demonstrating that to allow a UCL suit to include thinly-disguised Section 790.03 violations would be an impermissible circumvention or end run around Moradi-Shalal. The California Court of Appeal supported the insurers’ position on this issue in Textron Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1061 (2004).

Now, the Fourth Appellate District, in Zhang v. Superior Court (October 29, 2009), has rejected Textron, and held that because the UCL allows a plaintiff to allege unfair, unlawful, and misleading conduct against businesses generally (including insurers), the fact a plaintiff asserts what appear to be violations of Section 790.03 is not necessarily an end run around Moradi-Shalal.

In Zhang the plaintiff sued California Capital Insurance Company for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging the insurer improperly handled a claim for repair of property after a fire at his business. Zhang included a UCL count, which incorporated all the allegations that the insurer engaged in conduct that was barred by Section 790.03, but also alleged the insurer had acted unfairly by engaging in false and deceptive advertising, suggesting it would provide coverage in the event of a loss, when it had no intent to do so. 

The insurer demurred, arguing that per Moradi-Shalal, there is no private cause of action for a Section 790.03 violation, and that using the UCL to in effect assert a Section 790.03 violation is a circumvention of Moradi-Shalal, as confirmed by Textron

The trial court granted the insurer’s demurrer, but the court of appeal reversed, holding Moradi-Shalal did not bar the UCL claim. Acknowledging the contrary holding of the other court of appeal decision in Textron, the Zhang court nonetheless pointed to the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 4th 257 (1995), in which the high court rejected the idea that Section 790.03 was intended to “displace existing rights and remedies for unlawful business practices” in the insurance industry, among them the UCL. The court of appeal said it took from Manufacturers Life that there is no reason to treat insurers differently from other businesses when it comes to actions under the UCL, except as required by Moradi-Shalal.

Thus, the court of appeal concluded, if a plaintiff sues for conduct that is prohibited by Section 790.03, but not otherwise prohibited, then a plaintiff may not advance that claim under the UCL. Where, however, as in Zhang, a plaintiff alleges unlawful, misleading and untrue conduct that is expressly within the parameters of the UCL, the suit may proceed on that claim.

In response to those who make the “end run” argument, the Zhang court observed in a footnote that, as established in State Farm v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093 (1994), a UCL plaintiff is not entitled to seek compensatory and punitive damages, only restitution and injunction.

Given its conflict with Textron, the Zhang case will likely be the subject of an active effort to convince the California Supreme Court to grant a petition for review in Zhang (or request to depublish) – perhaps with the support of numerous amici.